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Abstract 
 
The dynamic and the structure of the economy determine the effects of political 
economy shocks, fiscal and monetary policy. Based on a DSGE model and stylized 
facts for small open economy, we evaluate the effects of fiscal consumption tax 
shocks on the presence of two fiscal rules in the periods of 1990 to 2000 and 2001 
to 2010. The two rules are based on: first, taxes adjust according to the debt level 
and government expenditures; and second, balanced budget where taxes adjust 
every time in order to preserve the equilibrium in the fiscal budget. Results show 
that after the fiscal shock hits the economy, the first fiscal rule has mayor 
stabilization effects on the economy than the second one, around 50%, and the 
GPD react greater than in the second period, 0.02%. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last economic downturn governments around the world have taken 
extraordinary fiscal measures in order to stimulate their economies and boost the 
aggregate demand, limiting job losses and easing negative effects of business 
cycles. In this sense, one of the central issues of Policy Makers is to review the Fiscal 
Policy effects on the economy and how it can contribute to the growth economy 
in the context where it is impossible to design a correct fiscal policy that meets all 
possible requirements: i) achieving low borrowing cost, ii) avoiding deficit bias, iii) 
smoothing the economic cycle and iv) stimulating government investment. 
 
During the nineties fiscal deficits were around -3.72%, in the period 2000 to 2010 the 
deficits were in the order of 2.13% and finally between 2006 to 2010 fiscal surpluses 
were around 2.8%. The positive environment induced increments on fiscal 
expenditure and poses the question about its effectiveness on the economy. 
Besides, we test how the economy responds against to consumption tax shock in 
the context of two fiscal rules. 
 
This paper seeks to investigate, review and analyze the fiscal expenditure and 
consumption tax shocks effects and the stabilization properties of fiscal rules in 
Bolivia’s. Since Bolivia doesn’t have any fiscal rule; we impose to the model 
structure fiscal rules and simulate them using a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with the New Keynesian macroeconomic vintage for a 
small open economy (SOE) adding different types of shocks to assess the whole 
response of the economy. 
 
In line with Kocherlacota (2010) and Galí et. al. (2007), the paper builds a DSGE 
model. The paper introduces consumption heterogeneity (rule – of – thumb), 
market imperfections, and sticky prices following the Calvo mechanism and 
applies different types of fiscal rules. First, as in Galí et. al. (2007), taxes are 
endogenous and move in response to government expenditure and debt level. In 
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the second rule, we have a balanced budget in every period where taxes react 
every period in two cohorts, 1990 to 2000 and 2001 to 2010. 
 
In particular, we modified the principal benchmark in order to find more relations 
that allow us explain the Bolivia’s economy since it is a small dollarized open 
economy (SDOE). In order to simplify the external effects we use the Hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve. Based on Balakrishnan and López Salido (2002) we 
modified the production function and its factor structure so as to put in and assess 
the pass – through to the economy. 
 
Monetary Policy in Bolivia doesn’t have traditional instruments to shock the 
economy, like an interest rate rule (Taylor Rule), but we use open market 
operations interest rate as proxy and applied it on the rule proposed in Schmidt – 
Hebbel and Tapia (2002) and Caputo et. al. (2006). Interest rate not only reacts to 
the inflation and output deviations, but also to interest rate lags (rigidities) and 
changes in nominal exchange rate. 
 
Results and simulations were reached using DYNARE routine, but first the model 
must be log – linearized. The calibration of deep parameters is used for Bolivia’s 
economy was design for the two periods contemporaneous ones common in 
literature that help us explain the behavior in other developing economies. 
 
The application of two fiscal rules are compared to model without a fiscal rule, so 
the canonical model allow us to assess the true multiplier effect of fiscal and tax 
shocks on fundamental macroeconomic variables for the economy.  
 
In the nineties, fiscal shock produces an increase in total consumption in 0.5% 
explained by a positive increase in the rule – of – thumb households. However, a 
fiscal shock generates pressures on inflation through the cost channel; so, interest 
rate respond against fiscal pressures on inflation restrained pressures on inflation. In 
the first period, results show that first fiscal rule has greater stabilization properties 
than the second in the presence of the two shocks. 
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During de period 2000 – 2010, the effects of fiscal shock is greater than in the 
nineties, consumption and GDP reacts greater, implying that in this period the 
dynamics of aggregate demand responds positively to fiscal impulses, 0.02%. On 
the same way, the first fiscal rule stabilize the economy more than the second. 
   
The model structure and the cohorts allow us to assess the effects of the fiscal 
shock on the other variables. It produces nominal exchange rate mix results and 
real exchange rate appreciation. On the other hand, risk premium and tax 
pressure increases in presence of first fiscal shock 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2, reviews literature about fiscal 
expenditure effects and other economies experience; section 3, develop the 
model methodology; section 4, describes data and calibration; section 5, shows 
fiscal shock effects under the two fiscal rules, and finally section 6, concludes and 
give new future investigation guidelines 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Empirical evidence on the fiscal rules effects on the economy in the new 
macroeconomic vintage, called newkeynesian, are fewer. Valdivia and 
Montenegro (2008) shows that in the presence of fiscal rule, fiscal shock effect on 
prices are moderate, Machicado et. al (2010) evaluate the effects of public 
expenditure policy in Bolivia and if it is enough for economic growth - without any 
fiscal rule –. But the model calibration was in base of a specific year. Then, 
empirical papers and investigation in this way are restricted to other economies. 
 
Traditionally, fiscal rules are designed to reduce the level of debt or at least to 
prevent the debt/GDP ratio increasing further in each economic cycle. In the case 
of EMU countries, fiscal consolidations were forced by the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact, Ballabriga and Mongay (2002) or Gali and Perotti 
(2003). Their results confirm that before the Maastricht Treaty the primary budget 
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balance showed little correlation with the output gap, but correlation is positive 
and statistically significant in the consolidation period; secondly, the response of 
the primary budget surplus to the lagged debt to trend GDP ratio is more than 
three times larger in the consolidation period than in the pre-Maastricht one. 
 
Empirical evidence of fiscal rules are find Australia, Canada, Germany, New 
Zeeland, Spain, United States, European Union, table 1. 
 
Table 1 
International Fiscal Rules 
Australia: A Charter for Budget Honesty requires the government to ‘spell out its objectives and targets’, but is not
enforced.
Canada: There are no legislated rules, but the government had a ‘balanced budget or better’ policy from 1998.
Germany: The Domestic Stability Pact contains a version of the UK’s golden rule, requiring that the budget deficit does
not exceed investment. It is not enforced.
New Zealand: A non-binding rule that debt and net worth be maintained at a ‘prudent’ level and operating surpluses be
run over a ‘reasonable’ period of time. The government of the day sets its own numerical targets, without enforcement. 
Spain: The 2004 Fiscal Stability Law requires that accounts at all levels of government show a surplus.
United States: From 1990 to 2002, the Budget Enforcement Act required that legislated changes to revenues or
mandatory spending programmes be budget neutral over a five year time-frame.
European Union: The Stability and Growth Pact requires EU members to aim for a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 per cent
and keep annual deficits below 3 per cent of GDP, or face an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ with the potential for fines to
be levied for the repeated breach of the rules. However, the 3 per cent target can be avoided in exceptional
circumstances’, the definition of which was substantially widened in 2004 after several countries breached it without
real sanction. A number of countries, like Italy and Belgium, have never come close to meeting the 60 per cent debt
ratio.  
Source: Murray and Wilkes (2009) 
 
The negative response of the consumption against an increase in government 
spending is insufficient; this result can be obtained in Ricardian RBC models or as in 
the neoclassic model predictions, Christiano and Eichenbaum (2002), and Fatás 
and Mihov (2001, FM). 
 
Therefore most of the evidence is concentrated in VAR models. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002, BP) and FM (2001) found that, against to neoclassical models, in 
response to a fiscal expenditure shock consumption increases, but in different 
degrees. Besides, investment doesn’t have a unique response: in the first case, 
investment falls in great magnitude; and, in the second one, investment increases 
insignificantly. 
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Using United States quarterly data Galí et al (2007) shows when an increase in 
government spending is significantly it produces a persistent increase in output 
and at the same time a persistent increase in consumption2, working hours and 
real wage increases; and in the short run investment falls but in the medium it 
improves, but not significantly, finally deficit increases. 
 
Mountford y Uhlig (2004), Burnside et al (2003) find that in response to a fiscal 
shock, consumption responses weakly and not significantly. Additionally, Alesina 
and Ardagna (1998) show that during periods of fiscal consolidation, forecast of 
the neoclassical model were good; so, fiscal spending reduction yields positive 
movements in consumption and output. 
 
3. Model Methodology 
 
The model is based on Gali et. al. (2007), we model a small open economy (SOE) 
in order to introduce the Bolivia’s economy characteristics. 
 
3.1 Households 
 
Newkeynesian models with rule – of – thumb households, includes myopic or lack 
of credit, it helps us to explain positive movements in total consumption against 
business cycle models with full ricardian agents or neoclassical models. Rule – of – 
thumb households only consume the product of their work, they have fear to save 
(asset accumulation) and ignore intertemporal consumption. On the other hand, 
ricardian households or optimizers have assets and access to the capital market 
and receive benefits of the firms.  
 
The coexistence of these two types of agent allows us to explain the positive 
movement of total consumption in response to a fiscal shock. 
 
                                                 
2  This output is explained because of the introductions of rule – of – thumb consumers in the canonical structure 
of the model 
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3.1.1 Ricardian households 
 
They have a utility function subject to a budget constraint and response to their 
own characteristics. Following Galí et. al. (2007) we can introduce investment at 
last. 
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Capital law of motion with adjustment cost is: 
    (3) 
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as lump sum taxes (or transfers if it is negative) paid by Ricardian consumers. 
 
Furthermore, capital law of motion must be ( ) ( ) 0'',0' ≤> φφ  with ( ) 1' =δφ , and 
adjustment cost function in steady state are equal to capital depreciation rate, 
( ) δδφ = . 
 
The utility function takes a separable one: 
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c
t υυ ,  are idiosyncratic shocks of preference that hits consumption and labor. The 
taxation effect on Ricardian households can be seen in the Euler equation that is 
shocked by preference shocks. 
 
Optimality conditions are: 
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The Euler equation is: 
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Capital shadow price, Tobin’s Q, is given by:  
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Moreover, we have two options for the labor market structure: first, a competitive 
labor market where each household choose labor supply given the market wage 
and; second, wages can be fixed by unions3. Then, in the last case, wages can be 
determined by households. 
 
Therefore, labor supply is influenced not only by taxes on consumption and work, 
but also is affected by preference of idiosyncratic shocks. 
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3 Bénassy (2002) ch 5. 
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3.1.2 Rule – of – Thumb households 
 
This type of households only receives income labor for their work. So, not only they 
consume all of their labor income, but also they don’t save. Additionally, they 
don’t have access to the capital markets.  
 
They have a utility function: 
  ( )NCU rtrt ,    (9) 
Subject to: 
  ( ) ( ) NWPCP rttNttrtctt ττ −+ = 11   (10) 
 
3.2 Demand goods 
 
In order to find the good market equilibrium we need to differentiate domestic 
and foreign consume. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), consumption takes a 
CES form. 
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Where tFtH CC ,, ,  are consumption of domestic and foreign goods4 and take a CES 
form and the Dixit – Stiglitz aggregators of imported and domestic goods are: 
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and we imposed that the aggregate price level is given by: 
                                                 
4 We didn’t take into account imported goods because we use the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, and put 
imported goods in the production function and it takes the CES form. So, effects of imported prices affect 
directly to the NKPC. 
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  ( )( ) ( ) ccc PPP tFtHt ηηη αα − +−= −− 1
1
1
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,
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So, when tHtF PP ,, = , α is the proportion for domestic goods given the imported 
goods. α is the natural open index. 
  
3.3 Aggregation 
 
Aggregation is as follows: Total consumption is the sum of Ricardian households 
and rule – of – thumb. The total number of hours worked is the same as total 
consumption and λ is the share of rule – of – thumb. 
  ( )CCC otrtt λλ −+= 1   (15) 
  ( )NNN otrtt λλ −+= 1   (16) 
Since only Ricardian consumers have access to the capital market, investment 
and capital stock market are given by: 
  ( )II ott λ−= 1    (17) 
  ( )KK ott λ−= 1    (18) 
Domestic and foreign assets, including fiscal debt BGt *  are given by: 
  ( )BB ott λ−= 1    (19) 
  ( )BBB otGtt λ−+= 1 ***   (20) 
 
3.4 Firms 
 
There exists a continuum set of competitive monopolistic firms. All of them produce 
only intermediate goods; but production factors are competitive. In particular, 
final goods are produced by constant return technology (CES production 
function). 
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( )jYt  is the quantity of intermediate goods used as input. So, intermediate goods 
demand is given by Dixit – Stiglitz aggregator: 
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And prices are given by: 
 
  ( )( ) pp djjPP tt εε −∫= − 1 110 1   (23) 
 
3.4.1 Intermediate Goods 
 
We assume a continuum set of monopolistic firms. In order to put the pass- through 
in the price equation, HNKPC, we use imported price goods as input. Our 
production function takes a CES form with M and N as inputs. 
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At is the technology and technology shock act through this, and sσ is the elasticity 
of substitution between imported goods and work. Both of them are greater than 
zero. Intermediate imported goods are ( )tjM 5. 
 
Given that the real price of factors MtP  and tW , the equilibrium through a 
minimization cost is: 
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Marginal cost is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ssssss WP tMtMC σσ αα σσσσ −− −− += − 11 12121   (26) 
 
                                                 
5 Intermediate firms’ aggregation also takes a CES form. 
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3.1.5 Price setting 
 
Following Calvo (1983), (1-θ) is the fraction of firms that reset its price optimally 
each period believing that the price chosen will be optimally t periods ahead. 
While a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. Based on Galí and Gertler (1999), 
we can put in the optimal price a fraction of firms that reset their prices forward – 
looking, (1-ω).  At the same time, a fraction ω set prices backward – looking. This set 
of firms reset their prices based on the optimal price and inflation in t-1. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ){ }∑ ΨΛ∞
=
++++ −
0
*
,
k
ktktkt
f
tkttt
k jjjMax YYPEθ   (27) 
Subject to  
   ( ) ( ) YP
PY kt
kt
f
t
kt
pjj +
−
+
+ 







=
ε
*
  (29) 
The cost function is ( )( )jY ktkt ++Ψ  and *ftP must satisfy the first order condition: 
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In steady state we can get kktt β=Λ +, . Moreover, to complete the dynamic price 
we must use the following equation. 
  ( )PPP ttt θθ −+= − 1 *1   (32) 
  ( ) PPP btftt ωω *** 1 += −   (33) 
  pi 1
*
1
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+= tt
b
t PP    (34) 
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3.5 Monetary Policy 
 
Since Bolivia doesn’t have common policy instruments, monetary interest rate rule, 
we can model monetary policy by Taylor Rule and taking care of exchange rate 
and output. This type of rule was used by Schmith – Hebbel and Tapia (2002) and 
Caputo et. al. (2006) 
 
 ( )( ) υψψpiψψψ pi mttstytitit syii +++−+ ∆= ∆− 11   (35) 
 
We use open market operations interest rate as proxy, it is the interest rate, that is a 
monetary policy tool, piψ and yψ  are responses of the monetary authority to 
deviations of inflation and GPD growth of their natural level. s∆ψ shows response to 
nominal exchange rate deviations. 
 
3.6 Fiscal Policy 
 
Government budget constraint and taxes revenues are given by: 
     (36) 
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3.6.1 Fiscal Rules 
 
Galí et. al. (2007) proposed a fiscal rule where taxes revenues are equal to 
government expenses. Let’s define Y
GG
t
tg −= , Y
TT
t
tt −= and bonds as Yt
P
B
tP
tB
b
−




−
=
1 . So, 
according to this rule, taxes adjust whenever debt or spending change.   
 
Fiscal rules applied are a generalization of García and Restrepo (2007). 
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 ( )( ) GPBYPSPIPYPCP ttgtbFtFttFttttttttct φφττ +=−+−+ *  (38) 
 
Allowing 1=gφ  and 0=bφ , the government budget constraint is in equilibrium, and 
in order to hold it taxes must adjust in every period. 
 
 ( )( ) GPYPSPIPYPCP ttgFtFttFttttttttct φττ =−+−+ *  (39) 
 
3.7 Market clearing condition 
 
Market clearing conditions are given by: 
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  XNGICY ttttt +++=   (42) 
 
And equilibrium in the economy is given by: 
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3.8 Closing the model 
 
In order to close the model we must use the following equations: 
 
Real exchange rate 
  
P
PSRER
t
F
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t
*
=    (44) 
Interest rate 
  pi 1++= ttt rinom   (45) 
 
Uncovered interest parity 
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  ssrr ttttt −+=− ++ 1
*
1pi   (46) 
 
3.9 Stochastic exogenous process 
 
Many shocks hit the economy: 
 
Preference shocks 
  ευρυ ctctcct += −1    (47) 
 
  ευρυ NtNtNNt += −1   (48) 
 
Technology shocks 
  ερ attat aa += −1    (49) 
Monetary shocks 
  ευρυ mtmtmmt += −1   (50) 
Fiscal spending shocks 
  ερ gtt
g
t gg += −1   (51) 
Foreign interest rate shocks 
  ερ ** 1** rttrt rr += −    (52) 
Foreign prices shocks 
  ερ
** *
1
* FF p
t
F
t
pF
t pp += −   (53) 
 
Where iρ  represent shocks persistence itε  and follows a normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance 2
,tiσ , 
**
,,,,,,
FmNc prgai υυυ=  and innovations are not 
correlated. 
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4. Data and calibration 
 
We use the following series: consumption, GDP, investment, fiscal spending, net 
exports, tax rate, real remuneration, total population working, Bolivian real interest 
rate, open market operations interest rate, nominal and real exchange rate, 
inflation, domestic and external debt; and foreign interest rate. 
 
Log – linearization technique requires all variables must be log – deviations from 
steady state6, so it’s necessary use some steady state measure7, but there is not 
theory that supports the steady state, e.g. GDP, should be a moving average 
weighted, which is HP’s outcome. In this sense, all variables are hit by shocks and it 
produces changes in business trend – cycles, therefore, high frequency band pass 
filter proposed by Christiano & Fitzgerald (1999), which is unvaried method,  allow 
us to incorporate business cycles and isolate short or long run movements 
privileging business cycles defined by the researcher. 
 
Alternatively, we can use the Nadaraya – Watson non – parametric filter. So, if we 
understand seasonality as systematic movement, no necessary regular, produced 
in the year, Hylleberg (1992); the problem is, how to treat it? First, there is a group of 
economists that believe that seasonality must be eliminated; second, another 
group point out that seasonality is known by economic agents and they will make 
their decisions according to these; consequently, it should be an error to eliminate 
seasonality in an economic research. 
In this sense, to isolate seasonality components, we have a lot of methods and 
procedures and it performs depend on what we are looking for: a) an effortless 
filter which use regression with dummy variables; b)Box – Jenkins (1976) difference 
seasonality filter; c) ARIMA X-11 and X-12 filter; d) TRAMO/SEAT filter. 
                                                 
6 In  dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models we must understand that it refers to the natural level where 
there is no market frictions  
7 Hodrick y Prescott filter is generally accepted 
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Based on Bianchi (1997), we applied ARIMA X-12 which discomposes series under 
an additive background. Trend – cycle component can be obtained using ARIMA 
X-12, so we can apply a kind of filter like HP to get the cycle and long run trend. 
 
Steady states of variables and calibrated parameters are listed in tables 1 and 2. 
The following steady states are obtained using Christiano Fitz Gerald filter: C/Y, I/Y, 
G/Y, X/Y, M/Y, G/C, Pf/P, Yf/Y, RER, N, W, inflation and tax pressure. Country risk 
premium is calibrated using Corp Banca Group average qualification to Bolivia. At 
the same time, consumption, labor and capital taxes are taking from Bolivian tax 
structure.   
 
Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve parameters are obtained from Valdivia (2008) 
taking care of contemporaneous pass – through similar to other papers for Bolivia, 
before 2005. Moreover, Taylor rule, which takes the responses of the Central Bank 
to variations of nominal exchange rate, is estimated by General Method of 
Moments (GMM). Results of the GMM procedure gave us consistency when the 
Central Bank is worried about exchange rate movements, in our case crawling – 
peg system.  
 
Nominal interest rate calibration is based on the Central Bank of Bolivia Monetary 
Report (January, 2008). Besides, Bolivia population structure of Ricardian 
households and rule – of – thumb households are taking of National Statistical 
Institute household’s surveys. The last parameters are standard in economic 
literature   
 
5. Effects of fiscal shocks 
 
Results are showed between the two periods, figure 1. In the subsequent figures 
are showed the impulse response functions, the stochastic movement are 
explained by the presence of different shocks and their correlations.  The first, 1990 
- 2000, shows the effects of fiscal and consumption tax shocks. GDP, consumption, 
investment and current account responds much more in the presence of the first 
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fiscal rule 0.12%, 0.23% and -0.19%, respectively; additionally prices increases 0.25%. 
In the second period, 2001 – 2010, the fiscal policies multiplier effect are greater 
than in the first one,  GDP is 0.02% greater, and the distributional effects inside 
consumption in favor of rule-of-thumb household is better through and increase in 
fiscal revenue, tax pressure. These results are explained by the realization of fiscal 
surpluses since 2006. This result reinforces the driving force and multiplier and the 
effect of fiscal policy on the fundamentals. In the presence of the first fiscal rule, 
the multiplier effect of fiscal policy has distributional effects, especially on 
households. 
Figure 1 
Effects of fiscal shocks between periods 
(Response in t=0) 
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Fiscal rules reduce exogenous shocks effect on the economy. Figure Nº 2, shows 
how fiscal shock hits the economy and how the model reacts without fiscal rules. In 
this case, domestic debt, foreign debt, total consumption, rule – of –thumb 
households, ricardian households, investment, capital, nominal interest rate, labor, 
Tobin’s Q, inflation, country risk premium, real interest rate, real exchange rate, 
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marginal cost, tax pressure, nominal exchange rate, wages, net exports, capital 
price and output (GDP) reacts. 
 
If we consider positive shocks in all exogenous variables, we can expect that 
variables are hit by the fiscal shock and other shocks; they generate movements 
that produce oscillations in impulse responses functions. For that reason, once the 
fiscal expenditure shock hit the economy, the model structure, with lags, allows 
oscillations in variables due to they are hit by other shocks. 
 
In the whole period, we can observe that fiscal spending shock has positive effect 
over total consumption, as a consequence of agent’s structure, figure Nº 1. As we 
expected, rule – of – thumb households reacts in a positive manner explained, 
0.38%, by an increase in the real interest which reduces Ricardian household’s 
consumption, -0.26%. GDP increases, 0.13%, inflation increase, 0.19%, through the 
firms channel cost.  
 
The multiplier effect of fiscal spending shock is reflected in new levels of foreign 
debt, it increases in 11%, which has effects on variables taking in the model. As a 
consequence of increases in price of factors, labor supply increases, 0.35%, 
explained by hand – to – mouth households. On the other hand, there is a nominal 
appreciation of exchange rate, 0.01%, as an effect of inflation increases greater 
than interest rate increase. At the same time, since price increases are greater 
than nominal exchange rate depreciation, it turns out a weaker real exchange 
rate appreciation, 0.21%; so net exports are affected negatively, 0.21%, but over 
the time it recovers to its natural level and is led by exchange rate movement. 
 
Shadow price of capital, Tobin’s Q, falls as a consequence of negative effect of 
fiscal spending shock, 0.0019%. This result is consequence of increases in prices that 
are greater than increases in real interest rate and capital price. Moreover, 
country risk premium falls in 0.23%, and foreign debt increase is greater than output 
and inflation increases. Finally, since output increases, pressure tax is pushed up by 
output movements, 0.53%. 
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Figure Nº 1, also shows how the model reacts to the second fiscal rule, when only 
taxes act, and how it helps to reduce the effect the fiscal spending shocks. In this 
case, since the economy is hit by fiscal expenditure shock, it reduces the tax 
pressure, 1.06% and the economy decrease approximately 0.36%. 
 
Impulse response structure is the same as the first fiscal rule, but magnitudes are 
different. The most relevant results are: a) the increase of total consumption is 
greater than the first one; b) since the increase in factor prices is greater than the 
first one, marginal cost is higher and pass – through to inflation increases  are more 
than in the first case; c) since inflation increases, the Central Bank responses 
aggressively through increases nominal interest rate, so investment contraction is 
higher than depreciation in nominal exchange rate in order to moderate inflation 
imported. 
 
Finally, in the case of Bolivia we need to know, what of the two fiscal rules have 
more stabilizing effects against to a fiscal spending shock? In figure Nº 1, we 
compare results obtained above with a canonical model that doesn’t have a 
fiscal rule. 
 
In all outcomes obtained above, the first fiscal rule, when taxes act against to new 
external debt in order to generate more fiscal spending, has more stabilizing 
effects. In particular, the effect of fiscal spending shock on inflation is moderated 
around 50% of the total effect. 
 
Despite of the fiscal shock effects on output is sacrificed, and all variables which 
are influenced by it. In terms of welfare, the result obtained above is preferable 
because rule-of-thumb households are better and the fiscal policy applied success 
in terms of distributional effects 
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6. Conclusions  
 
We developed a canonical model according to new macroeconomic vintage 
called new Keynesian models with imperfect competition in the determinacy of 
inflation. 
 
Based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we looked for to 
compare the fundamentals performance when they are shock by fiscal shocks in 
two periods 1990 – 2000 and 2001 - 2010. We used two types of fiscal rules: first, 
taxes adjust according to debt level and government spending, therefore debt 
plays a central role; second, a budget balanced – zero debt – where taxes adjust 
every time in order to keep equilibrium. 
 
Consequently, after computing and simulating our three models, two of them with 
different fiscal rules and one without fiscal rule, our results can be summarized as 
follows: a) an increase in GPD, 0.02%, greater than in the first period, an increase in 
consumption of rule – of – thumb households, 0.1%; b) since marginal cost 
increased, through HNKPC, inflation raises more than expected, and Central Bank 
must react through raising the monetary policy interest rate leading investment to 
diminish in the short run, -1.06%, so as to reduce inflation pressures, 0.25% to 0.19%. 
 
Finally, the most important result is how the first fiscal rule has more stabilizing 
effects over the fundamentals and overall in the model than the second one 
when we consider a budget balanced getting zero debt level, in the two periods 
analyzed. Inflation reduces around 50% as a consequence of applying the fiscal 
rule.  
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Table Nº 2 
Steady States 
C_Y G_Y I_Y M_Y X_Y TCR PF_P yf_y tau_c g_c t_y
1990-2000 0,7672 0,1340 0,1707 0,2784 0,2051 0,9541 0,4596 1,9410 0,1564 0,1750 0,1197
2001-2010 0,6736 0,1509 0,1490 0,3070 0,3360 1,0104 0,5627 1,8495 0,2976 0,2249 0,1961  
Table Nº 3 
Basic Parameters 
σ Risk aversion coefficient    2 
τc consumption tax rate    20% 
τn Labor tax rate     13% 
τk  Capital tax rate     40% 
λ Weight of rule – of – thumb households  0.7 
ϕ Marginal elasticity of labor disutility  1.7 
υc Consumption idiosyncratic shock in ss  1 
υn Labor idiosyncratic shock in ss   1 
δ Depreciation rate     0.25 
η Investment elasticity to Q    1 
Π Inflation in ss      2.18% - 1.14% 
ηx RER elasticity exports    1 
α Capital share in CES production function 0.61 
ξf HNKPC forward parameter    0.4966 
ξb HNKPC backward parameter  0.4581 
λpi HNKPC marginal cost parameter  0.4852 
χmc HNKPC foreign pass-through   0.4278 
σs CES Substitution elasticity     2 
ψi Taylor rule inertial interest rate component   0.84 – 0.91 
ψpi  Taylor rule inflation component  2.14 – 3.42 
ψy Taylor rule output component   0.023 – 0.046 
ψs Taylor rule nominal Exchange rate variation comp  8.94 – 6.13 
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Figure Nº 2 
Fiscal Shock Impulse Responses  
No Rule  
1990-2000 
 
2001-2010 
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Figure Nº 3 
Fiscal Shock Impulse Responses 
Rule 2 
1990-2000 
 
2001-2010 
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Figure Nº 4 
Fiscal Shock Impulse Responses 
Rule 2 
1990-2000 
   
 
2001-2010 
   
 
 
R1 rule 1, R2 rule 2 and “C” represent the canonical model without rule 
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Appendix A 
Log – linearized Model 
Log- linearized model solution around the steady state is: 
 
Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households: 
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Aggregation of consumption: 
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Capital law of movement: 
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Real Exchange rate: 
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Labor and consumption shocks: 
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The Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
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Fiscal Rule 2 
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